Michael Sandel: "If markets define what is valuable, a moral vacuum is created that is filled by religion and nationalism."

The American philosopher Michael J. Sandel (Minneapolis, 1953), author of premonitory books such as Democratic Discontent , from 1996, and of referential essays on the neoliberal world such as What Money Can't Buy or The Tyranny of Merit , publishes together with the economist Thomas Piketty Equality (Debate/Edicions 62), a conversation about the problems of inequality for the dignity of individuals and for democratic life, with omnipotent arch-millionaires and masses with profound discontent.

The Road to Donald Trump “Inequality is not only economic, but also a matter of respect and social recognition, and this has propelled Trump.”

Has rising inequality led to the success of Donald Trump and other populist leaders?

Yes. There are two dimensions of inequality. There is economic inequality, of income and wealth. And then there is inequality of respect, of social recognition and esteem. The dimensions of inequality are more than economic; they have to do with how we live together, how we regard one another as fellow citizens. And it is this second type of inequality, that of respect, of dignity, that I believe has contributed most to fueling the anger and resentment that figures like Trump exploit.

He says the elites have looked down on the losers of globalization.

And that has led to a reversal of traditional political affiliations and loyalties. Center-left parties like the Democrats and Labor drew their support from working people. Since Roosevelt and the New Deal, the Democratic Party established itself as the party of the people against the privileged few who controlled irresponsible economic power. Today, the majority of workers disproportionately vote for Trump. And the Democrats are a party that identifies more with the professional classes and those with college degrees. Their affiliations have reversed in two decades.

He is highly critical of the Clinton and Obama administrations.

Reagan and Thatcher came to power declaring that government was the problem and markets the solution. They embodied the triumphalist faith of the market. They were replaced by center-left politicians like Clinton, Blair, and Schröder who smoothed over the rough edges but never questioned the fundamental premise that markets are the primary instruments for achieving the common good. They embraced the neoliberal version of globalization. They accepted the deregulation of the financial sector that led to the 2008 crisis. And then they accepted a bailout of Wall Street. That created this alienation.

He points out that a crucial moment was 2008, when Obama could have chosen between rescuing Wall Street or the people.

During the years of neoliberal globalization and financial deregulation, finance claimed an increasing share of GDP and corporate profits and came to dominate economics and politics. And Obama had to choose, when the system collapsed, between restructuring it or rebuilding it. He chose the latter. This cast a shadow over his presidency, which began with great idealism. The Democratic Party has not recovered. And this explains Trump's success.

“Biden departed from neoliberal orthodoxy, but failed to articulate a vision.”

Biden did change the policies.

Yes, he wasn't to the left of the Democratic Party, but he was instinctive. And he sensed that the old neoliberal version of globalization—with its free trade agreements, free movement of capital, financial deregulation, and the concentration of power in large corporations—was no longer working. And it undermined confidence in democracy. He departed from that orthodoxy. He enacted major legislation for public investment in infrastructure, an industrial policy, investing in chips, and renewable energy. He strengthened antitrust enforcement against tech companies. He talked less about meritocratic competition and more about the dignity of work. However, he wasn't able to articulate a new vision, to explain how those policies contributed to a new role for government in the economy. When Roosevelt transformed the role of government, he explained it as a new deal, and people understood that it was a new way of holding economic power democratically accountable. Biden wasn't able to articulate a vision. He was more of a tactical politician. And these potentially very important changes never made public sense or resulted in fundamental change.

Is Trump staging a revolution?

He has channeled and harnessed the anger of those who feel slighted by elites and challenged the neoliberal ideal of a borderless world. I'm not sure you can call it a new vision of government, but "Make America Great Again" symbolizes people's yearning for some control over their collective destiny. His tariff policy is a chaotic and arrogant attempt to impose his will on the world. But people like J.D. Vance do have strategic vision, a certain vision of nationalism and its relationship to an economy that takes borders more seriously and will try to turn the Republicans into a true party of working people.

“Democrats must shift their philosophy to one focused on the dignity of work, on how to improve the lives of all those who contribute to the common good.”

He says the left must shift from the idea of ​​meritocracy to recognition of those who contribute to society.

The Democratic Party needs to stop focusing on how to prepare people to climb the ladder of success by earning educational degrees, ignoring the fact that the rungs of the ladder are becoming increasingly distant. It needs to change the idea that inequality can be solved by promoting individual upward mobility through higher education. This is not enough and has reinforced inequalities of dignity and respect. It must shift that philosophy to one focused on the dignity of work—how to improve the lives of all who contribute to the economy and the common good, whether or not they have a degree. Why should electricians and nurses be seen as contributing less to the common good than consultants or hedge fund managers? Emphasizing individual upward mobility neglects what we have in common, what we owe one another, the cultivation of solidarity, and mutual accountability. We need to repair the civic infrastructure of a shared democratic life.

He calls for a debate on the value of education, culture, and health, and for us not to leave it in the hands of the markets.

Liberal societies tend to shy away from public debate about competing conceptions of the good life. This is understandable: in pluralistic societies, we disagree on many moral issues. But it is a mistake to ask citizens to set aside their moral convictions when entering the public sphere. It leaves us with the assumption that the money people earn is the only measure of their contribution to the common good. Does the inspirational teacher we had in school really contribute 5,000 times less to the common good than a hedge fund manager? We must reclaim from the markets the question of what counts as a valuable contribution to the common good. That requires value judgments, sometimes questionable ones. But it is better to debate them than to delegate them. If you keep moral argument out of public debate, it creates a moral vacuum that will be filled by intolerant attempts at value assertions—usually religious fundamentalism or hypernationalism. Attempts to fill a moral vacuum created by allowing markets to define what is valuable.